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Abstract
This paper considers a pricing and remanufacturing problem in closed-loop supply
chain which includes one dominant manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain
environment. The remanufacturing cost, market demand, and collection cost are
characterized as uncertain variables. The firms’ optimal strategies are obtained by
uncertainty-theory-based and game-theory-based models. Besides, the impacts of the
risk sensitivity on the performances of the closed-loop supply chain members are given
by the comparison of different degrees of the retailer’s risk aversion and numerical
studies. It is found that only the manufacturer makes more profits when the retailer is
more risk sensitive but this condition in the closed-loop supply chain still leads to
better performance of the total system.
Keywords: Closed-loop supply chain; Uncertain variable; Remanufacturing; Pricing
decision; Risk aversion
Introduction
With the worldwide promotion of low-carbon economy and sustainable development,
closed-loop supply chain management has played an increasingly important role in
both the environment and economic activities throughout this decade [1–6]. Reverse
collection and remanufacturing are becoming more and more important under this
background. Increasing researches about reverse supply chain management have been
conducted in this decade [7–11]. For instance, Wei and Zhao [8] addressed the decisions
of reverse channel with three different used products collection channels from customers
and investigated how the implications of these models affect the decisions of the man-
ufacturer, the retailer, and the third party. Govindan [10] reviewed recently published
papers in reverse logistic and closed-loop supply chain in scientific journals and suggested
future research opportunities according to these papers. Wei and Zhao [11] considered
the pricing and remanufacturing decisions in a duopoly market with two competing sup-
ply chains, each of which includes one manufacturer and one retailer. Five game decision
models were established to explore the chain members’ optimal strategies on price and/or
remanufacturing and examined the influences of some key parameters and chain
members’ maximum profits through numerical studies.
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According to the lack of referable historical data and uncertainties in collection of
used products, we adopt uncertainty theory instead of probability theory to solve prob-
lems with such variables. For now, uncertainty theory has been successfully applied to
many fields, such as option pricing problem [12], stock problem [13], production control
problem [14], supply chain pricing problem [15], uncertain random process [16], project
scheduling problem [17], and so on. In this paper, we consider the remanufacturing cost,
market demand, and collection cost as uncertain variables.
Besides, many researches also take the risk in supply chain into consideration. Agrawal
and Seshadri [18] considered a single-period inventory model in which a risk-averse
retailer faces random customer demand and decides the selling price with the objective
of maximizing expected utility. This research also provided a better understanding of
retailers’ pricing behavior that could lead to improved price contracts and channel man-
agement policies. Barry [19] addressed that the world is at risk and the supply chain is
not exempt and raised some essential supply chain questions that have impacts on the
field which is from outside of the supply chain. Xiao and Yang [20] developed a price-
service competition model of two supply chains, each including one risk-neutral supplier
and one risk-averse retailer to investigate the optimal decisions of players under demand
uncertainty and analyzed the effects of the retailers’ risk sensitivity on the players’ opti-
mal strategies. Ke et al. [21] studied a pricing decision problem in fuzzy supply chain with
one manufacturer and two risk-sensitive retailers.
The goal of this paper is to analyze how risk sensitivity affects the performances of
the channel members. In consideration of different degrees of the risk aversion of the
retailer, two different models are built to derive the optimal management strategies of
the supply chain members under different decision scenarios. Moreover, the impacts
of the risk sensitivity on the performances of the closed-loop supply chain are also
given by numerical studies. It is found that only the manufacturer makes more prof-
its when the retailer is more risk sensitive. Meanwhile, this choice in the closed-loop
supply chain leads to better performance of the total system. The results also show
how the uncertainty in the supply chain influences the pricing and remanufacturing
decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Preliminaries are presented in “Preliminar-
ies” section. Some useful notations and necessary assumptions are discussed in “Prob-
lem description” section and two uncertain models are detailed in “Models and solution
approaches” section. In the “Analysis of the strategy decision” section, numerical exper-
iments are applied to analyze the effects of the uncertainty and power structures on the
optimal decisions and maximal profits. Some conclusions are given in the “Conclusions”
section.
Problem description
In this paper, we consider a closed-loop supply chain pricing problem which includes
one dominant manufacturer and one retailer and analyze how the retailer’s risk sensitiv-
ity affects the performances of the channel members. In the forward supply chain, the
manufacturer produces new products by using the original component at unit cost cm,
remanufactures products from used products at unit cost c˜r , which is an uncertain vari-
able, and wholesales the products to the retailer with unit wholesale price wr , which is a
decision variable. Then, the retailer sells products to the costumer at unit sales price pr ,
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which is a decision variable. In the reverse supply chain, the used products are recycled
from the consumers by different channels.
This paper considers two types of models to distinguish the risk sensitivity of the
retailer: (a) expected value (EV) model: both the manufacturer and the retailer are
assumed to be risk neutral; (b) chance-constrained (CC) model: the manufacturer is
assumed to be risk neutral while the retailer is assumed to be risk sensitive. Within
the above two models, we assume that the manufacturer defines the collecting rate τ ,
0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. The collector recycles the used products at unit collecting cost c(τ ). According
to Savaskan et al. [3], the collection cost c(τ ) can be denoted as
c(τ ) = kτ 2 + p˜cτq (1)
where kτ 2 denotes the fixed expense for recycling used products, k is an elastic parameter,
p˜cτq denotes the variable collection cost, τq denotes the total number of used products
which will be remanufactured, and p˜c denotes the unit collection cost of used product, an
uncertain variable. The notations which will be used in our paper are as follows:
cm: unit manufacturing cost of the product
wr : unit wholesale price of the product, a decision variable
pr : unit sales price of the product, a decision variable
c˜r : unit remanufacturing cost of the product, an uncertain variable
p˜c: unit collection cost of used product, an uncertain variable
τ : the used products collecting rate, 0≤ τ ≤ 1
In order to attain the closed-form solutions, some assumptions of this work are made
as follows:
Assumption 1. (Linear demand function) Due to the complicated and changeable envi-
ronment, the demand elastic coefficient cannot be estimated precisely. We define the
demand function as a price-dependent linear form
q = d˜ − β˜pr (2)
where d˜, β˜ are uncertain variables, d˜ denotes the primary demand of the new products,
while β˜ denotes the measure of the responsiveness of the new product’s demand to its own
price.
Assumption 2. All the uncertain coefficients are assumed nonnegative and mutually
independent.
Assumption 3. (Dominant manufacturer) The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader,
and the retailer is the follower under both the two collection models.
Assumption 4. (Risk-averse retailer) The retailer is assumed to be risk averse.
Throughout this paper, we adopt the convention of pronoun “he” to refer to the man-
ufacturer and pronoun “she” to refer to the retailer. The manufacturer in each decision
scenario makes his decision to maximize his own expected profit, subjected to the
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retailer’s response. We solve the retailer’s response function firstly, given that she has
observed the manufacturer’s decision.
Models and solution approaches
In this section, Stackelberg game models are employed to derive the equilibrium prices in
different scenarios.
EVmodel
In this model, the manufacturer dominates the supply chain and first announces the unit
wholesale price wr and the used products collecting rate τ . After observing wr and τ , the
retailer then decides her most profitable sales price pr . Meanwhile, both the manufacturer







(w − cm(1 − τ) − (p˜c + c˜r)τ )q − kτ 2
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pr − wr > 0
(3)
The retailer’s profit function πr(pr) can be denoted as









] = (pr − wr)E [d˜]+ E [β˜]wrpr − E [β˜] p2r . (5)
Proposition 1. Under the EV model, the retailer’s reaction function, denoted as pdr, can















Under the EV model, the manufacturer’s profit function, denoted as πm(wr , τ), can be
given as
πm(wr , τ) =
[
w − cm(1 − τ) − (p˜c + c˜r)τ
]
q − kτ 2. (7)
The manufacturer’s objective is to maximize his own expected profit E [πm(wr , τ)],
which can be given as follows

































Ke et al. Journal of Uncertainty Analysis and Applications  (2015) 3:14 Page 5 of 14

















] holds, the optimal wholesale price,


























































d (1 − α)




According to Propositions 1 and 2, Proposition 3 can be easily obtained.
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The CCmodel is to maximize the objective function under a certain confidence level and
has been widely used to deal with problems with risk-sensitive decision makers.
In this model, the conditions are as same as the former and the retailer is also assumed
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pr − wr > 0
(12)
In this paper, we assume that the retailer is risk averse, which means that the confidence
level α > 0.5. To solve the model, we should transform the uncertain model into an
equivalent model first.
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−1d (1 − α) − −1β (α)pr
)
pr − wr > 0
(13)
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The retailer’s profit function πr(pr) can be denoted as
πr(pr) = (pr − wr)
(
−1d (1 − α) − −1β (α)pr
)
. (14)
Proposition 4. Under the CCmodel, the retailer’s reaction function, denoted as pdr, can
be given as follows by considering the manufacturer’s decisions wr and τ ,
pdr =
−1d (1 − α) + −1β (α)wr
2−1β (α)
. (15)
Under the CC model, the manufacturer’s profit function, denoted as πm(wr , τ), can be
given as
πm(wr , τ) =
[






q − kτ 2. (16)
The manufacturer’s objective is to maximize his own expected profit E[πm(wr , τ)],
which can be given as follows
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According to Propositions 4 and 5, Proposition 6 can be easily obtained.

















] holds, the optimal
retail price, denoted as p∗dr, is given as
p∗dr =
−1d (1 − α) + −1β (α)w∗dm
2−1β (α)
. (20)
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Analysis of the strategy decision
Due to the complicated forms of the equilibrium prices, numerical examples rather than
analytical comparisons are conducted to explore the effects of the risk sensitivity of the
retailer on equilibrium prices.
Consider a case in which cm = 40, k = 1200, pb = 12, the unit collecting cost p˜c is
about 5, the unit remanufacturing cost c˜r is about 20, the market base d˜ is about 202.5,
and the price elasticity β˜ is about 8. These linguistic descriptions of the parameters can
be denoted as uncertain numbers as shown in Table 1.
Referring to Lemma 3, the expected values of the uncertain variables are given in





= 190 + 2 ∗ 200 + 2204 = 202.5.





















(4(1 − α) + 6α)(200(2 − 2(1 − α)) + 220(1 − 2(1 − α)))dα
=1007.5.













The optimal prices andmaximal profits of the participants with different degrees of risk
aversion are given in Table 2.
On one hand, we compare the optimal values of the wholesale price, used products
collecting rate, and sales price in the CC model and the EV model according to Table 2.
• It is clear that the optimal values of the wholesale price and the collecting rate of used
products are becoming higher along with the increase of α in the CC model, which
means that the manufacturer can decide higher wholesale price when the retailer is
more sensitive to the risk.
• The sales price is becoming lower with the increase of α in the CC model.
• Consumer may prefer that the retailer is risk sensitive because the sales price is
highest in the EV model.
On the other hand, the maximal profits of the whole system and individual firms are
taken into comparison according to Table 2.
• Both the maximal profits of the whole system and the manufacturer are becoming
higher when α increases in the CC model.
• The maximal profit of the retailer is becoming lower when α increases in the CC
model.
Table 1 Distributions of uncertain variables
Parameter p˜c c˜r d˜ β˜
Distribution L(4,6) L(19, 21) Z(190, 200, 220) Z(0.7,0.8,0.85)
Expected value 5 20 202.5 0.7875
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Table 2 Optimal decisions and maximal expected profits
Decision scenario α w∗r τ ∗ πm p∗ πr πm + πr
EV - 185.9999 0.2807 4119.13 221.5714 996.45 5115.58
0.6 152.8141 0.2797 5303.43 198.6293 2111.14 7414.57
0.7 155.4727 0.2865 5556.37 197.2485 1970.43 7526.80
CC 0.8 158.0673 0.2932 5808.88 195.9011 1824.65 7633.53
0.9 160.6000 0.2997 6060.80 194.5857 1674.26 7735.06
1 163.0732 0.3060 6311.95 193.3013 1519.72 7831.67
• The maximal profits of the whole system and individual firms are lowest in the EV
model which means that the manufacturer prefers that the retailer is more risk
sensitive.
Conclusions
In this paper, we considered an uncertain pricing decision problem in closed-loop supply
chain with risk-averse retailer. The remanufacturing cost, consumer demand, and used
products collecting cost were defined as uncertain variables. Uncertainty-theory-based
and game-theory-based models were applied to obtain the optimal strategies. The equi-
librium behaviors of the participants in the operational level and the optimal decisions
on wholesale price, sales price, and used products collecting rate were derived from these
models. Numerical experiments were also given to supervise the effects of the retailer’s
risk sensitivity in strategy level.
Our works mainly focus on the impacts of the retailer’s risk sensitivity on the per-
formances of the closed-loop supply chain members with the dominant manufacturer.
The different dominant participants and the selections of the recycling channels are the
important directions for the future research.
Appendix
Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce some important concepts and theorems of uncertainty
theory for modeling the pricing decision problem with human belief degree.
Let  be a nonempty set and L a σ -algebra over . Each element 	 in L is called
an event. The set function M, initiated by Liu [22] and refined by Liu [23], is called an
uncertain measure if it satisfies:
Axiom 1. (Normality axiom)M{} = 1.
Axiom 2. (Duality axiom)M{	} +M{	c} = 1 for any event 	.
Axiom 3. (Subadditivity axiom) For every countable sequence of events {	i}, i =










Besides, the product uncertain measure on the product σ -algebra L was defined by Liu
[24] as follows:
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Axiom 4. (Product axiom) Let (k ,Lk ,Mk) be uncertainty spaces for k = 1, 2, · · · The










where Ak are arbitrarily chosen events from Lk for k = 1, 2, · · · , respectively.
Definition 1. [22] An uncertain variable is ameasurable function ξ from an uncertainty
space (,L,M) to the set of real numbers, i.e., for any Borel set B of real numbers, the set
{ξ ∈ B} = {γ ∈  ∣∣ ξ(γ ) ∈ B}
is an event.










for any Borel sets B1,B2, · · · ,Bn.
Definition 3. [22] The uncertainty distribution  of an uncertain variable ξ is defined
by
(x) = M{ξ ≤ x}
for any real number x.
An uncertainty distribution  is referred to be regular if its inverse function −1(α)
exists and is unique for each α ∈[ 0, 1].
Lemma 1. [23] Let ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξn be independent uncertain variables with regular
uncertainty distributions 1,2, · · · ,n, respectively. If the function f (x1, x2, · · · , xn) is
strictly increasing with respect to x1, x2, · · · , xm and strictly decreasing with respect to
xm+1, xm+2, · · · , xn, then
ξ = f (ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξn)
is an uncertain variable with inverse uncertainty distribution
−1(α) = f
(
−11 (α), · · · ,−1m (α),−1m+1(1 − α), · · · ,−1n (1 − α)
)
.








provided that at least one of the above two integrals is finite.
Lemma 2. [23] Let ξ be an uncertain variable with uncertainty distribution . If the
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Lemma 3. [23] Let ξ be an uncertain variable with regular uncertainty distribution .










0, x < a
(x − a)/(b − a), a ≤ x ≤ b
1, x > b
(21)





(a + (b − a)α)dα = a + b2 . (22)





0, x < a
(x − a)/2(b − a), a ≤ x ≤ b
(x + c − 2b)/2(c − b), b < x ≤ c
1, x > c
(23)
and its inverse uncertainty distribution is
−1(α) =
⎧⎨
⎩(1 − 2α)a + 2αb, α < 0.5(2 − 2α)b + (2α − 1)c, α ≥ 0.5. (24)




((1 − 2α)a + 2αb)dα +
∫ 1
0.5
((2 − 2α)b + (1 − 2α)c)dα = a + 2b + c4 .
(25)
Lemma 4. [25] Let ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξn be independent uncertain variables with regular
uncertainty distributions 1,2, · · · ,n, respectively. A function f (x1, x2, · · · , xn) is
strictly increasing with respect to x1, x2, · · · , xm and strictly decreasing with respect to






−11 (α), · · · ,−1m (α),−1m+1(1 − α), · · · ,−1n (1 − α)
)
dα (26)
provided that the expected value E[ ξ ] exists.
Example 3. Let ξ and η be two positive independent uncertain variables with regular
uncertainty distributions  and  , respectively. Then, we have




−1(α) − −1(1 − α)) dα. (27)
Definition 5. Let ξ˜ and η˜ be uncertain variables. We define




















ξ˜ αη˜1−α + ξ˜1−αη˜α
)
dα.
Proof of Proposition 1


































is concave in pr . Setting Eq. (28) to zero, the first-order


















pr = 0. (30)
By solving Eq. (30), Eq. (6) can be obtained. Proposition 1 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 2
Referring to Eq. (8), the first-order partial derivatives of E [πm(wr , τ)] to wr and τ can
be shown as











































































d (1 − α)
+−1cr (α)−1d (1 − α)
)
dα − 2kτ .
(31)










































= −2k < 0.
(32)
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Solving Eq. (34), we obtain Eq. (9). Proposition 2 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 4




= −1d (1 − α) + −1β (α)wr − 2−1β (α)pr , (35)
∂2πr(pr)
∂p2r
= −2−1β (α) < 0. (36)
It follows Eq. (36) that E[πr(pr)] is concave in pr . Setting Eq. (35) to zero, the first-order
condition can be given as follows
∂πr(pr)
∂pr
= −1d (1 − α) + −1β (α)wr − 2−1β (α)pr = 0. (37)
By solving Eq. (37), Eq. (15) can be obtained. Proposition 4 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 5































































d (1 − α) + −1cr (α)−1d (1 − α)
)
dα − 2kτ .
(38)








































∂2E [πm(wr , τ)]
∂τ 2
= −2k < 0.
(39)
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d (1 − α) + −1cr (α)−1d (1 − α)
)
dα − 2kτ = 0.
(41)
Solving Eq. (41), we obtain Eq. (18). Proposition 5 is proved.
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